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ABSTRACT 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has struggled over the years to 
develop the concept of what constitutes a "reasonable zone of 
privacy" when it comes to intrusion on an individual's physical 
space or activities.  With the advent and widespread adoption of new 
technologies such as drones and listening devices, concern for 
protecting privacy has magnified, yet court doctrine remains 
inconsistent.  The author, Washington State's Chief Privacy Officer, 
reviews the history of Supreme Court "search and seizure" rulings 
in prominent cases to identify both patterns and flaws on the topic 
of protecting citizen privacy. 
 
  
                                                                                                                       
* Alex Alben was named the first chief privacy officer of Washington State 
in 2015. He is a graduate of Stanford University and Stanford Law School. In his 
first job he worked as a researcher for Walter Cronkite at CBS News and then for 
CBS Reports. After law school, he served as an entertainment lawyer for Orion 
Pictures and Warner Bros., before beginning a tech career in Seattle with senior 
management positions at Starwave Corp. and RealNetworks, Inc. Alben teaches 
a section of the Privacy Law Clinic at the University of Washington School of 
law.  The opinions expressed in this article are his own. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On May 31, 2016, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Virginia ruled en banc, by a 12-3 vote, that our most durable privacy 
law—the Fourth Amendment—does not protect cell phone data 
pinpointing a caller’s location.1 In this particular case, law 
enforcement convicted two Baltimore men of multiple armed 
robberies in 2011 by analyzing 221 days of their wireless location 
data, which pinpointed 29,000 different locations.2 The court 
reasoned that, because cell phone owners know that their location 
information is shared with their wireless carrier, as under the third-
party doctrine, an individual can claim "no legitimate expectation of 
privacy" in information that he has voluntarily turned over to a third 
party.3 
The Graham ruling calls into question whether a "reasonable 
expectation of privacy" exists with respect to wireless location data. 
It also seems to contradict the broad pro-privacy affirmation 
expressed the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Riley v. 
                                                                                                                       
1 United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2016) ("[T]he 
Government's acquisition of that information (historical CSLI) pursuant to § 
2703(d) orders, rather than warrants, did not violate the Fourth Amendment."). 
2 See generally Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016). 
3 Id. at 427 ("Applying the third-party doctrine to the facts of this case, we hold 
that Defendants did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the historical 
CSLI."). 
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California, which held that police must obtain a search warrant 
before opening an individual’s cell phone incident to a search.4   
The definition of 'zones of privacy' has evolved over three 
distinct phases of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The first phase, 
from 1891-1924, involved the arcane "open fields" or “open view” 
doctrine."5 The second phase, from 1928-1967, allowed for 
widespread government wire-tapping, but ended with the Court’s 
1967 ruling in Katz v. United States, which articulated a “reasonable 
zone of privacy” standard.6 Finally, the "open fields" doctrine 
reemerged in the 1980’s in conjunction with contemporary drug 
cultivation operations. As a result, the Court reverted to finding no 
violation of the Fourth Amendment —even in cases of intrusion on 
private property.7 Examining these three eras sheds considerable 
light on the privacy rights, or lack thereof, in America today. 
 
I. NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND ZONES OF PRIVACY 
 
While the Supreme Court has historically struggled to define 
a person’s reasonable zone of privacy, technology has run circles 
around the judiciary.  Fifteen years ago, the public had very little 
expectation that private companies would take satellite photographs 
to compile aerial views of every American neighborhood, down to 
recognizable houses, gardens, garages, and lawns.8 Nor did people 
commonly exercise property rights in vertical air space above her 
                                                                                                                       
4 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) ("[A] warrant is generally 
required before such a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to 
arrest.). 
5 The terms "open fields" and "open view" are used interchangeably in this 
article, although later decisions tend to use the "open view" phrase to describe 
the general doctrine. 
6 Katz v. United States, 398 U.S. 347 (1967). 
7 See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1923) 
8 See generally, Samuel Gibbs, Google Maps: a decade of transforming the 
mapping landscape, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 8 2015, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/08/google-maps-10-
anniversary-iphone-android-street-view.  
3
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domain extending all the way up to outer space.9 With the rapid and 
widespread adoption of new technologies, lawmakers have 
generally surrendered potential privacy claims to Google, Bing and 
other mapping services as these technologies expanded. 
Google Street View poses a closer case for privacy 
advocates, in part because of how it acquires data.10 A camera-laden 
car mapping a neighborhood might snap a photograph of an 
individual in an embarrassing pose. This technology, however, has 
widely been ruled to be legal in a variety of jurisdictions because the 
mapping vehicle is using public streets and taking photos of scenery 
that can otherwise be seen with the naked eye.11 In this sense, 
Google’s resources and technology have logarithmically expanded 
the old legal doctrine of "open view."12  
U.S. law might not have permitted Google Street View, 
however, had, a strange and enduring definition of a person’s home 
through physical invasion or curtilage not been articulated by the 
Supreme Court over eighty years ago.13 
 
                                                                                                                       
9 While the ad coelum doctrine refers to ownership of land up to the heaven and 
down to the center of the earth, it had little practical application above ground 
until the invention of airplanes.  See Environmental Justice, Peter S. Wentz, p. 
177, SUNY Press, 1988.  When a man tried to claim ownership of certain rights 
in asteroid Eros 433, the Ninth Circuit held that he stated no recognizable legal 
claim either under common law or the Outer Space Treaty.  Nemitz v United 
States and or, Decision on motion to dismiss, 2004 WL 3167042 (D Nev 2004), 
ILDC 1986 (US 2004), 26th April 2004, United States. 
10 Alexis C. Madrigal, How Google Builds Its Maps—and What It Means for the 
Future of Everything, THE ATLANTIC (Sep. 9, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/09/how-google-builds-its-
maps-and-what-it-means-for-the-future-of-everything/261913/. 
11 See, e.g., Boring v. Google, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 695, 700 (W.D. Pa. 2009) 
(ruling in favor of Google and dismissing privacy claims because Google Street 
View were images that were in plain sight. Interestingly the court noted it would 
be "hard to believe" the plaintiffs suffered "shame or humiliation."). 
12 The open fields doctrine holds that persons cannot assert protection for 
activities conducted in open fields because such areas are not protected places or 
things under a plain language reading of the fourth amendment. See Seth H. 
Ruzi, Reviving Trespass-Based Search Analysis Under the open view Doctrine: 
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 191, 196 (1988) (citing 
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1923)). 
13 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
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II. PHASE I – THE STRANGE DOCTRINE OF CURTILAGE AND 
OPEN FIELDS (1891-1924) 
 
Much of the failure of American courts to delineate 
reasonable zones of privacy traces back to the historic Supreme 
Court ruling in Olmstead v. United States.14  In writing for the 
majority's ruling on relatively modern technology—telephones and 
the government interception of telephone wire transmissions—
Chief Justice William Howard Taft drew on the ancient property 
concepts that informed most privacy law in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries.15 Taft concluded that a Fourth Amendment violation 
does not occur unless there has been an official search and seizure 
of a person’s papers, or tangible material effects.16 Further, a search 
would not occur unless there was an "actual physical invasion of his 
house or curtilage for the purpose of making a seizure."17 
Prior to Olmstead, courts adhered to an archaic construction 
of zones of privacy. One has to turn to the 1891 edition of Black’s 
Law Dictionary to find a working definition of "curtilage:" 
"The enclosed space of ground and buildings 
immediately surrounding a dwelling-house. In its most 
comprehensive and proper legal signification, it includes 
all that space of ground and buildings thereon which is 
usually enclosed within the general fence immediately 
surrounding a principal messuage and outbuildings, and 
yard closely adjoining to a dwelling-house, but it may be 
large enough for cattle to be levant and couchant 
therein."18 
                                                                                                                       
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 466. Additionally, a Fourth Amendment analysis is outside the scope of 
this Article. 
17 Id. (emphasis added) 
18 Curtilage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 311 (6th ed. 1891) (first alteration in 
original) (emphasis added). 
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For those not familiar with "messuage," it is a property law term 
referring to a dwelling and its outbuildings and curtilage.19 For those 
not raised in 18th century French farmhouses, "levant and couchant" 
refer to the practice of cattle rising up and lying down.20  
While humans tend to conduct illegal activities indoors, we 
have the outdoorsy moonshine and marijuana-growing businesses to 
thank for the evolution of our legal doctrines on privacy and open 
fields. In Hester v. United States,21  the Supreme Court explored the 
question of whether a person’s zone of privacy extended to the open 
fields surrounding a home or farm, an inquiry that would lead to the 
creation of the "open fields" doctrine. In 1924, federal agents stood 
50-100 yards away from Hester’s farm and observed him handing a 
quart bottle to another man.22 The bottle contained home-grown 
distilled spirits, illegal in the Prohibition Era.23 On this basis, the 
agents subsequently arrested Hester, who claimed in court that they 
had trespassed on his property and violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights.24 
The Court felt no sympathy for Hester, reasoning that if his 
fields were readily visible from an adjacent property and the agents 
had conducted no physical trespass, the unfortunate moonshiner had 
no Fourth Amendment privacy argument to make.25 Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes encapsulated the Court’s reasoning, holding that 
"the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the 
people in their 'persons, houses, papers and effects', is not extended 
to the open fields."26  
Thus, "open fields" remained fair game for law enforcement 
for decades. First articulated in Hester, the doctrine informed much 
of the Supreme Court’s thinking as new technologies came onto the 
scene after the turn of the century. 
                                                                                                                       
19 Messuage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) available at Westlaw 
BLACKS. 
20 Levant and couchant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) available at 
Westlaw BLACKS. 
21 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). 
22 Id. at 58. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 59. 
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III. PHASE II – WIRETAPPING FROM OLMSTEAD TO KATZ 
(1928-1967) 
 
Over a forty-year period, American courts allowed telephone 
and broadcast technologies to flourish without scrutiny under the 
Fourth Amendment—at least in the context of wiretapping-- until 
Olmstead v. United States.27 Presiding over the 1928 case of 
prominent Seattle bootlegger Roy Olmstead,  the Supreme Court 
held that federal agents had not conducted a search-and-seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment after wiretapping 
Olmstead’s telephone line to record his conversations with members 
of his illegal liquor distribution operation.28 
In 1924, federal agents tapped Olmstead’s phone and took 
notes on his conversations. These were then transcribed in a "black 
book" that the prosecutor used to charge a total of forty-seven 
defendants, including Olmstead’s attorney and his wife Elise.29 
Given the unsophisticated technology of the time, the agents could 
not see the numbers that Olmstead and his associates were dialing. 
To solve this problem, they crossed the tapped phone line with 
another line, causing interference.30 Olmstead then had to verbally 
instruct the operator which number he wished to dial. The FBI 
                                                                                                                       
27 Olmstead, supra note 13; see also Daryl C. McClary, Olmstead, Roy (1886-
1966) — King of King County Bootleggers, HISTORY LINK (Nov. 13, 2002), 
http://www.historylink.org/File/4015. (Olmstead had served on the Seattle 
Police force as an enforcer of Seattle’s early prohibition law and later the 18th 
Amendment when it came into effect in 1920. Olmstead observed the operations 
of the region’s bootleggers and concluded he could do better. After serving a 
brief prison sentence for running an alcohol smuggling operation while still a 
member of the force, he returned to bootlegging full time, smuggling alcohol 
from Canada primarily by small boats to beaches and coves in Washington 
State). 
28 Olmstead, supra note 13, at 464. 
29 See Daryl C. McClary, Olmstead, Roy (1886-1966) — King of King County 
Bootleggers, History Link (Nov. 13, 2002), 
http://www.historylink.org/File/4015. 
30 Olmstead, supra note 13, at 487.  
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agents posted within earshot of his office recorded these numbers in 
their notebooks, then did a "reverse look-up" to find the addresses 
linked to them.31 After a twenty-four-hour trial, Olmstead was 
sentenced to four years of hard labor and fined $8,000.32  
The case arrived at the Supreme Court in 1928, when former 
President William Howard Taft presided as Chief Justice. Writing 
for the Court, Taft demonstrated he had a rudimentary 
understanding of telephony by stating that he simply did not see a 
Fourth Amendment violation because the government did not 
intrude on Olmstead’s physical space: "[t]here was no searching. 
There was no seizure. The evidence was secured only by the sense 
of hearing. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the 
defendants."33 
The Supreme Court did not decide Olmstead unanimously. 
Justice Louis Brandeis examined the facts surrounding the wiretap 
and concluded that the federal agents had indeed violated the 
Constitution.34 In his dissent, Brandeis inquired, "can it be that the 
Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of 
individual security?"35 Justice Brandeis understood an invasion of 
privacy does not require a physical intrusion given the evolution of 
modern technology such as telephony.  
Six years later, Congress passed the Communications Act in 
1934, which explicitly outlawed the practice of wiretapping 
telephones without a court warrant.36 However, the Act did not 
address the legality of bugs and  other forms of electronic 
eavesdropping.37 
Thirty-three years later, the Supreme Court  considered 
                                                                                                                       
31 See Daryl C. McClary, supra note 29. 
32 Id. 
33 Olmstead, supra note 13, at 464. 
34 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464. 
35 Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
36 Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§151-622 (1934). 
37 See Congressional Research Service, "Privacy: An Overview of Federal 
Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Elctronic Eavesropping," Stevens and 
Doyle, October 9, 2012: "The Act neither expressly condemned law 
enforcement interceptions nor called for the exclusion of wiretap evidence, but it 
was read to encompass both, Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); 
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939)." 
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whether the FBI had violated a man’s expectation of privacy under 
the Fourth Amendment when it tapped a phone booth outside of his 
Los Angeles apartment due to suspicion that he was placing illegal 
bets on college basketball games.38 In 1967, Charles Katz was in 
fact one of the country’s most successful basketball handicappers 
and bettors, having evaded persistent law enforcement efforts to 
catch him in the act.39 By disabling one phone booth and planting 
recording devices on the tops of two others on Sunset Boulevard, 
FBI agents managed to overhear his betting conversations with 
associates in Miami and Boston.40  
There was one flaw with the FBI’s plan: the agents did not 
have a search warrant when they intercepted Katz’s conversations.41 
As a result, Katz’s attorneys filed an appeal arguing that the 
recordings could not be used as evidence against him on Fourth 
Amendment grounds.42 Following Olmstead, however, the court of 
appeals rejected Katz’s argument, citing the absence of a physical 
intrusion into the phone booth itself and ignoring the FBI's elaborate 
surveillance scheme in targeting Katz and monitoring his calls via 
the two working phone booths.43 
Nevertheless, Katz ultimately prevailed. The Supreme Court 
ruled 7-1 that Katz was entitled to constitutional protection for his 
conversations.44 Justice Potter Stewart wrote for the Court:  
"The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. 
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even 
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to 
                                                                                                                       
38 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
39 See Matthew Lasar, The crooks who created modern wiretapping law, ARS 
TECHNICA (Jun. 2, 2011, 6:47 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2011/06/the-crooks-who-created-modern-wiretapping-law/. 
40 Katz at 131. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 133. 
43 Id. at 134. 
44 Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 359. 
9
Alben: "Reasonable Zones of Privacy"—The Supreme Court's Struggle to Fin
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2017
154        WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS      [VOL. 12:2          
 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public [e.g., a phone booth] may be constitutionally 
protected."45 
A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan introduced the idea 
of a "reasonable" expectation of Fourth Amendment protection.46 
Harlan invented a two-part test for "reasonableness" in this context: 
"first, that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation 
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’"47  
 
IV. PHASE III – OPEN FIELDS AND DRUGS: THE 1980S 
 
As the illegal production of alcohol prompted many open 
fields cases in a prior era, several cases in the 1980s reached the 
Supreme Court dealing with a new illicit activity that triggered 
reflection on meaning of the Fourth Amendment.48 Growing 
marijuana in open fields occupied the Court’s attention in the 1984 
case of Oliver v. United States.49  Oliver cultivated a marijuana crop 
in a field adjacent to his Kentucky property.50 Despite a posted "No 
Trespassing" sign, Kentucky State Police parked their vehicle, 
walked around a gate and proceeded down a footpath until they 
spotted the marijuana plants, about a mile from the gate.51 They 
arrested Oliver.52 
Once again, the Court found no search-and-seizure, due to 
the open nature of the landscape where the illegal growing operation 
was situated.53 Seeking to draw a distinction between portions of a 
property where an individual or family might have some expectation 
                                                                                                                       
45 Id. at 351. 
46 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
47 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
48 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (cultivation of marijuana on 
property); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 296 (1987) (running a private 
chemical plant in a barn on personal property). 
49 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
50 Id. at 173. 
51 Id. 
52 Id.. 
53 Id. at 184. 
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of property and other portions where they would not, the Court 
reasoned: "open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate 
activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from 
government interference or surveillance."54 
Three years later, agents of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration found a chemical manufacturing plant in a private 
barn on private ranch.55 Led by the smell of chemicals and the sound 
of a running motor, they skirted several fences—including at least 
one spiked with barbed wire—crossed a gate and entered the barn, 
where they apprehended their target.56 Although the Court of 
Appeals ruled that the barn—surrounded by several fences, was 
clearly within the owner’s "curtilage"57—the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Dunn disagreed, holding that this area was not 
"intimately tied to the home itself."58 Apparently, running a drug lab 
is not an intimate family activity. 
One might view Hester, Oliver and Dunn as 'result oriented' 
rulings, where courts knew that an illegal activity had occurred and 
chose to justify the fact that law enforcement failed to get a warrant 
by deciding that there is no zone of privacy if the activity is within 
'open view' or even in a barn. Before sophisticated surveillance 
technology, such rulings posed a threat to moonshiners and pot 
growers, but not to the average citizen in terms of government 
spying on private activities indoors or outdoors.  Privacy is no longer 
defined by the parameters of human senses such as vision or hearing, 
but now finds a new range of threats based on devices that take the 
concept of surveillance to a new plane.59 With the advent of drones, 
                                                                                                                       
54 Id. at 179. 
55 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 296 (1987). 
56 Id. 
57 United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093, 1100 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated,467 U.S. 1201, 104 S. Ct. 2380, 81 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1984), 
and opinion reinstated, 782 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1986). 
58 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 294. 
59 See Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the ‘Reasonable Expectation of Privacy’: 
An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1114-28 (1987) 
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thermal imaging and high-resolution cameras, the game has 
changed. "Curtilage" seems like a very quaint notion when a police 
officer can operate a bird-sized battery-powered drone and 
maneuver it directly over a suspect’s home or outside a window.60 
In these cases, law enforcement should simply get a warrant. They 
might have been tipped to the location of drug operation by an 
informant or other lead, but flying a surveillance drone over the 
scene violates any basic "reasonable expectation" of privacy in one’s 
property, whether indoors or outdoors.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Of all the Supreme Court’s struggles to develop a consistent 
doctrine to define a zone of privacy, the Katz formulation makes the 
most sense, because privacy rights should travel with the individual. 
The inherent vagueness of what is 'reasonable'" in different 
situations only creates room for uncertainty, especially as 
technology and our cultural norms continue to evolve. Now that the 
Fourth Circuit has ruled that no warrant is required for a wireless 
carrier to turn location data over to law enforcement, U.S. citizens 
live in a ‘Catch-22’ where individuals supposedly have "reasonable 
expectations" of privacy in physical spaces, such as phone booths, 
but almost no expectation of location privacy when they are using 
their cell phones.  
With the introduction of new technologies—ranging  from 
Google Earth aerial photographs to drone surveillance—the 
question of where public space ends and private space begins has 
reached a critical phase. Deciding the scope of a person’s "zone of 
privacy" will be the front-line question for judges and technology 
advocates to determine for the next generation. Examining the 
colorful and salient cases surveyed above hopefully provides a few 
                                                                                                                       
("[T]he presence or absence of a physical intrusion ostensibly ceased to be the 
focal point of [F]ourth [A]mendment analysis."). 
60 Hope Reese, Police are now using drones to apprehend suspects and 
administer non-lethal force: A police chief weighs in, TECHREPUBLIC (Nov. 25 
2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/police-are-now-using-
drones-to-apprehend-suspects-and-administer-non-lethal-force-a-police-chief/. 
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clues as to the way courts may eventually answer the question of 
where privacy begins in the modern world of smart phones and 
surveillance technologies. 
Given the inherent privacy interest of people as they move 
about the world, it seems paramount to address this question. Most 
Americans do not have a "reasonable expectation" that law 
enforcement can easily discover their whereabouts when making 
phone calls or strolling through a mall.61 Further, with the 
emergence of data analytics, law enforcement can potentially trace 
individuals through the course of a day, whenever they trigger a 
safety camera or license plate reader.62 The recent reforms of the 
Patriot Act passed in 2015 have pared back the government’s right 
to intercept our private communications, but the surveillance 
apparatus still exists.63 If we apply different privacy protections to 
different technologies, we run the risk of fundamentally eroding our 
remaining privacy rights.  Despite the march of technology, is it too 
much to ask that we can conduct our legal private activities within 
reasonable zones of privacy? 
 
  
                                                                                                                       
61 Simon Hill, Is your smartphone being tracked? We asked an expert, DIGITAL 
TRENDS (May 17, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/police-
hackers-phone-tracking/. 
62 Thirteen states have adopted varying limits on retention of automated license 
plate reader images.  See National Conference of State Legislatures web page, 
dated Feb. 27, 2017 and last checked March 7, 2017. 
63 Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring (USA 
FREEDOM) Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-23 (2015). 
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PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 Keep updated on new legislation. As the privacy 
landscape continues to rapidly evolve, we can identify 
new ideas for the protection of personal data and 
privacy rights, especially at the state and local levels. 
 Keep up-to-date on new technology. New tools, 
platforms and devices may use personally-identifiable 
information in innovative ways, which inexorably 
creates novel privacy questions. Explore the data 
retention practices and policies of the new technologies 
you or your clients might adopt for personal use. 
 Seek answers outside the field of law. Generally, 
privacy issues may not be limited to the legal field. 
Technology tends to outpace law, and consulting 
technology and communications publications will 
provide valuable context for considering privacy issues.  
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